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THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW IN FLORIDA
By its very nature the practice of law cuts across numerous other
occupations and professions. Real estate brokers, accountants, trust
officers, insurance salesmen, and claims adjusters are but a few of the
many professional people whose occupations encompass problems of
legal significance. Many such problems require little or no legal experience for a solution. Others involve more complex situations inherently requiring the aid of legal counsel. There is, however, a middle
ground that evokes the concern of the bar and the layman's defensive
allegations that the legal profession is intruding without invitation or
reason. An attempt to prescribe definitive bounds to opposing professions presents a difficult problem. The bar often seeks sole and exclusive jurisdiction in matters it considers to be the practice of law; the
layman insists that he has an unalterable right to the free pursuit of his
occupation. As the layman becomes more specialized in the technical
professions, the conflict deepens. A realistic appraisal necessarily calls
for presentation of both sides of the controversy.
Tim Powln OF

Tm CouRTs TO CONTROL ThE UNAuTHrom=E

PitAcncE oF LAw

The power of the Florida courts to control the practice of law or to
protect against unauthorized intrusions has not always been recognized
by the judiciary. In one of Florida's earliest disbarment cases1 the
county court of Escambia County stated that control over admission to
the bar and regulation of practice was not an inherent power of the
judiciary but rather a function of the legislature. The court relied
upon 'the apparent procedure for admission to the bar at early common law. This position was subsequently rejected as dicta by the
Florida Supreme Court,2 which concluded that the judiciary had the
inherent power to assume full responsibility for admissions to the bar,
disbarment for unprofessional conduct, and regulation of unauthorized
practice of law.
In 1949 the supreme court granted the Florida Bar Association's
petition to integrate the Florida Bar.8 Having acknowledged that the
unlawful practice of law was necessarily a concern of an integrated
bar,4 the court, in discussing its power to integrate the bar by rule of
court, stated: 5
1. State ex rel. Wolfe v. Kirk, 12 Fla. 278 (1868).
2. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1939).
3. Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
4. Id. at 904.
5. Id. at 905.
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Inherent power arises from the fact of the Court's creation or
from 'the fact that it is a court. It is essential to its being and
dignity and does not require an express grant to confer it. Under our form of government it is the right that each department
of government has to execute the powers falling naturally within
its orbit when not expressly placed or limited by the existence
of a similar power in one of the other departments.
Today it may be concluded that insofar as the State has the power
to control the practice of law within its confines, such power lies exclusively with the judiciary. The supreme court in the recent decision of
State ex rel. FloridaBar v. Sperry" has stated that its power is expressly
derived from article V, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, 7 which
vests the court with exclusive jurisdiction over admission to the practice of law and discipline of those persons admitted.8 The court concluded that section 23 carries with it the "power to prevent the practice of law by those who are not admitted to the practice."9 This
power, however, is not without limitation. To the extent that objectionable activities of a layman are connected to practice before a federal administrative agency, the State may be precluded from regulation or interference.1 0
The court has several remedies available to prevent the practice of
law by one not a member of The Florida Bar. The court has stated
that the unauthorized practice of law constitutes contempt of court,11
and the legislature has provided for the punishment of one unlawfully
engaging in such practice.12 Generally, however, judicial relief takes
6. 140 So. 2d 587 (1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
7. FLA. CoNSr. art. V, §23 provides: "The supreme court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons
admitted. It may provide for an agency to handle admissions subject to its supervision. It may also provide for the handling of disciplinary matters in the circuit
courts and the district courts of appeal, or by commissions consisting of members
of the bar to be designated by it, the supreme court, subject to its supervision and
review." FA. STAT. §454.021 (1963), similarly provides that admission and regulation of attorneys and counsellors is a judicial function.
8. For cases from other jurisdictions holding that the power to prevent unauthorized practice of law is founded upon the state constitution, see New Jersey
State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mfg Ass'n, 22 N.J. 184, 123 A.2d 498 (1956);
People v. People's Stock Yards Bank, 844 IMI.462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931).
9. 140 So. 2d at 588.
10. Sperry v. State ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
11. State ex tel. The Florida Bar v. Sperry, supra note 6.
12. FLA. STAT. §454.23 (1963): "Any person other than those entitled to
practice on June 25th, 1925, who shall practice law or assume to hold himself out
to the public as qualified to practice in this state, without first having obtained his
certificate from the state board of law examiners ... shall be deemed guilty of a
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the form of an injunction prohibiting an individual from engaging in a
specific activity. The attitude of the supreme court in protecting the
public from the unauthorized practice of law is reflected in its acceptance of article II, section 2 of the Integration Rules of The Florida
Bar,13 which generally denies practice in any form to those not active
members of the bar. 14
Proper Parties Plaintiff-ProperForum
As recently as 1962 the procedural requirements for the instigation
and maintenance of suit were unsettled. North Dade Bar Association
Inc. v. Dade Commonwealth Title Insurance Co.'1 raised the questions
of necessary parties plaintiff and of proper forum to hear the cause.
Suit was brought by a local bar association against a title company to
enjoin the latter from activities allegedly constituting the unauthorized
practice of law. A private attorney subsequently filed a petition to
intervene as party plaintiff. Holding that the suit could be "instituted
and maintained only by the integrated Florida Bar,"' the chancellor
dismissed the action. The Third District Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that any lawyer or voluntary bar association could bring an
action to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law. The court, however,
certified the question as one of "great public interest" and sent the case
to the supreme court. The supreme court reversed the decision,' 7 stating that the state constitution gave exclusive jurisdiction to the supreme court and, that in adopting the rules of the integrated bar in
1955, the court had made The Florida Bar its arm for "entertainment
and disposition of such matters under the court's supervision.' 8 Clarifying its position the court stated: 19
penal offense and upon conviction, be fined not more than one thousand dollars or
imprisoned in the county jail, with or without hard labor, for not more than twelve
months."
13. INTEGnATION RuLE OF TB FLORID BAR art. II, §2 provides: "No person
shall engage in any way in the practice of law in this state unless such person is an
active member of The Florida Bar in good standing except that a practicing attorney of another state, in good standing, who has professional business in a court of
record of this state may, upon motion, be permitted to practice for the purpose of
such business only, when it is made to appear that he has associated and appearing with him in such business an active member of The Florida Bar."
14. See Petition of Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953).
15. 143 So. 2d 201 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
16. Id. at 202.
17. Dade-Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. North Dade Bar Ass'n, 152 So. 2d
723 (Fla. 1963).
18. Id. at 726.
19. Id. at 727.
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[T]o hold that he [the attorney] individually cannot sue does
not mean that he is prevented from directing this Court's attention 'to any infraction or misdeed of another. He simply must go
to the proper court so the matter may be determined by procedure in channels which have been charted long since. But in
all such instances the ultimate decision shall rest in the Supreme
Court.
This decision should serve 'to increase the effectiveness of the lawyer's campaign against unauthorized practice, for it insures that each
formal proceeding will be the well-organized product of a concerted
effort on behalf of all attorneys in the state. The Florida Bar can control strategy and timing as best benefits the public by presenting -to the
court only those cases which, after careful study, are deemed to require
remedial action. 20
Although the procedural aspects of maintenance of suit and the
basis of judicial power to determine the cause are now well settled, the
general concept of unauthorized practice remains in controversy. The
quandary of the bar is well illustrated by its conflict with the real
estate broker.
THE BEAr. ESTATE BROKER
In the opinion of 'the real estate broker the ordinary conveyance of
land or the leasing of property presents no problems automatically requiring the aid of legal counsel. Generally a broker feels quite capable
of effecting a meeting of interested parties and a closing of the transaction. On the other hand, the bar fears that grave consequences will
result from the legal effect of those acts of the broker. Currently, nationally as well as in Florida, the controversy includes the drafting,
preparation, and completion by filling in the blanks of instruments of
conveyance.
The broker contends that the task of ordinary conveyancing is a
part of the everyday business of the realtor and requires no special
legal education. He denounces any contention that public policy warrants restraint by judicial decree. Judicial support for this proposition
20. Spencer, Unauthorized Practice of Law in Florida, 36 FLA. B.J. 96, 97
(1962): "1. After the local voluntary bar committee has considered a complaint,
it compiles a file on the subject matter, including documentary evidence, and forwards it to the State Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, together with a
recommendation of local vigorous, able counsel who is willing to handle the action.
2. The file is then reviewed by the state committee, and if a strong case is apparent they then recommend to the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar that suit
be filed. 3. Upon the Board of Governors' finding that suit should be brought, it
authorizes suit to be brought in the name of The Florida Bar, and may recommend
additional counsel to assist in processing the suit."
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is found in numerous decisions,2 1 notably the opinion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Cowern v. Nelson.22 That court in denying a petition to enjoin a23broker from effecting the closing of a real estate transaction stated:
We do not think it would be in the interest of the public welfare
to restrain brokers from drafting the ordinary instruments necessary to effectuate the closing of the ordinary real estate transaction in which they are acting. We do not think the possible
harm which might come to the public from the rare instances of
defective conveyances in such transactions is sufficient to outweigh the great public inconveniences which would follow if it
were necessary to call in a lawyer to draft these simple instruments.
A second argument advanced by the broker is that the mere filling
in of blanks is nothing more than a clerical task which does not require
the advice of legal counsel. In general the decisions supporting this
contention place a restriction on the broker which forbids him to give
advice on the selection and the legal effect of the instrument. 24 In
Ingram County Bar Association v. Walter Neller Co.25 the Michigan
Supreme Court realized that an absolute requirement that legal counsel prepare the instruments necessary to close a sale would, in many
instances, lead to delay and possible loss of the sale. The court accepted the argument that limiting the broker to the preliminary agreement did not meet the problem squarely as neither seller nor buyer is
bound until the contract for sale is completed and signed. The court
felt that the broker is interested until the sale is finally consummated.
Another contention that has found judicial acceptance is that the
bar, through its acquiescence in the normal practices of the realtor, has
in effect given up its right to exclusive jurisdiction over the preparation and completion of conveyancing forms. In Oregon State Bar v.
Security Escrows, Inc.,2 ° a 1962 decision, the court accepted this argument and concluded that whatever the reason behind the current es21. E.g., State Bar of Mich. v. Kupris, 866 Mich. 688, 116 N.W.2d 341
(1962); La Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 289, 56 A.2d 246 (1948)
(requirement of legal counsel would be a "burdensome formality").
22. 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).
23. Id. at 647, 290 N.W. at 797.
24. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 898, 312
P.2d 998 (1957); In re Mathews, 58 Idaho 772, 79 P.2d 535 (1938); State Bar of
Mich. v. Kupris, 366 Mich. 688, 116 NAV.2d 341 (1962); Hulse v. Criger, 368 Mo.
26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1962); Gustafson v. V. C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St.
392, 35 N.E.2d 435 (1941).
25. 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955).
26. 377 P.2d 334 (Ore. 1962).
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tablished practice of brokers and escrow agents in completing standard
forms, "it is now too late to raise the cry of 'unauthorized practice of
law' each time a lay conveyancer fills in the names, dates, and description on the simple form of warranty deed . . . f27 A similar result
was reached in Wisconsin in 1961 when the supreme court of that
state admitted that a real estate agent in completing some sixty forms
contained in the Wisconsin Statutes was in effect practicing law, but
held that this was not unauthorized practice.28 A rule of the Wisconsin
Real Estate Board sanctioned such practice by brokers, and the court
observed 'that the system, long tacitly permitted, had worked reasonably well. Both the Wisconsin and the Oregon decisions should serve
as a warning to those bar associations that have yet to challenge directly the broker's right to complete conveyancing forms.
In passing, it is worth considering the injury to the ego of the broker
who is forced to stop his negotiations until a lawyer fills in the names
of the parties, dates, amount of purchase price, and description of the
property. The broker quite naturally desires to convey to his clients
the impression that he is completely qualified to close a transaction.
The existence of a legal fee does not serve to foster this impression.
Whether the broker is completely qualified to guide a land transaction
to its completion presents an important question. The bar emphatically contends that he is not. To the bar the selection and adaptation
of the conveyance form, standard or otherwise, is far more important
than the "clerical" work involved in filling in the blanks. This feeling
29
has been expressed as follows:
Any legal form must be adapted skillfully to the transaction for
which it is used, so that it expresses the agreement of the parties
and defines the rights and obligations. Doing this is work of a
legal nature, and, when it is done by one unqualified, we not
only cannot condone its continuance but we must act to prevent
it, whether or not it is done for compensation.
In the recent case of State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title &
Trust Company,30 the court held that real estate brokers could neither
draft nor fill in blanks in deeds or conveyances relating to land in
which the broker did not hold absolute or equitable ownership or propose to acquire such ownership through the transaction. The court re27. Id. at 340.
28. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193. 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
29. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d
697, 700, 251 P.2d 619, 621 (1953); accord, People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n
v. Shafer, 404 IM.45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949).
30. 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371
P.2d 1020 (1962).
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viewed and refuted the arguments of the broker that: (1) the filling in
of blanks was a simple clerical task; (2) no separate compensation had
been received for preparation of the instrument; (3) the broker had a
proper interest in the subject matter; and (4) since the broker's practice of form completion was not new, judicial prohibition was unwarranted. The court adopted the following arguments of the bar.
(1) The filling in of any legal form involves or certainly should involve an analysis and selection of the proper form-a task requiring
legal training. (2) It is true that one may act for himself in legal matters, but the mere relationship of broker to customer does not place the
real estate agent in this position. 3 ' (3) The fact that no separate compensation is received for the act of filling in the form is of no significance. The court reasoned that many lawyers gratuitously handle an
indigent client's case. (4) The relationship of a lawyer and client is a
sacred one, controlled by canons of professional ethics; the broker or
land title company is likely to be concerned with the legality of the
transaction only insofar as personally affected. 32 (5) The argument
of bar acquiescence or the "prescriptive" right of the broker is not logical, for a wrong may be remedied at any time.3
It is apparent that where no separate fee or compensation is
charged for the completion of a conveyancing form, and such activity
is incidental to the broker's handling of the transaction, judicial decision must turn on whether such completion of standard forms by the
broker is a dangerous practice leading to legal entanglements. The
cases are in conflict,84 but a modern trend has developed in the direction of compromise and a partial restriction of the broker to specific
31. In discussing a necessary interest in the subject matter the court adopted
the position of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Carter v. Trevathan, 809 S.W.2d
746, 748 (Ky. 1958): "[Olne, who is not a lawyer, must not only act without
consideration for his services in drawing the paper but must be a party to, or his
name must appear in, the instrument as one to be benefited thereby. Merely
having a pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in the transaction covered by the instrument he draws will not suffice to relieve him of the charge of the unauthorized
practice of law unless he is a party to, or his name appears in, the paper as one of
the beneficiaries thereof."
32. See Note, The Completion of Deed Forms by Real Estate Brokers, 44
MARQ. L.R. 519 (1961).
83. The court concluded that acceptance of the broker's argument would in
effect be saying: "We have been driving through red lights for so many years
without serious mishap that now it is lawful to do so." 90 Ariz. at ..- , 366 P.2d
at 18.
84. For cases holding that this constituted the unauthorized practice of law
see, e.g., People ex rel. Illinois Bar Ass'n v. Shafer, 404 MII. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773
(1949); Herter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179
S.W.2d 946 (1944); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors,
Contra, e.g., Conway-Bogue v. Bar
41 Wash. 2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952).
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forms or instruments.3 5 The position of the Florida Supreme Court
may be considered as a part of the modem trend.

The Keyes and Cooperman Decisions
The leading case in Florida on unauthorized practice by brokers is
Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Association.3 6 In the Keyes case, the
Dade County Bar Association sought to prevent defendant realtor
from filling in the blanks of various instruments of conveyance. The
Florida Supreme Court did not delve deeply into the basic question
whether it is good policy to allow a layman to complete any forms
of conveyance, but rather attempted to allocate professional bounds
within the land transaction. The result was a restriction of the broker
37
that are a part of the preliminary negotiations.
to those instruments
33
The court stated:
So it seems logical and fair that the realtor be restricted in the
drafting of papers to those, such as a memorandum, deposit receipt, or the contract, as the case may be, recording his handiwork-that is, the bringing together of buyer and seller.
The court clearly emphasized that once the broker had brought the
buyer and seller together, the remainder of the transaction lay within
the field of the lawyer. Although the court's policy appeared clear on
its face, it soon became apparent that the realtor did not feel that the
Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 213 P.2d 998 (1957); State Bar of Mich. v. Kupris, 366
Mich. 688, 116 N.W.2d 341 (1962); Cowen v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W.
795 (1940); Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 844 (1952); Oregon State
Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334 (Ore. 1962).
35. See Creekmore v. Izard, 367 S.W.2d 419 (Ark. 1963), holding broker
may fill in blanks in simple printed forms approved by an attorney, provided that
the broker's client had declined to employ a lawyer and had authorized the broker
to prepare the form. This decision modified Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Block, 230
Ark. 430, 323 S.W.2d 912 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 836 (1959), which held
that the preparation of all instruments except offer and acceptance forms constituted unauthorized practice of law. See also State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n
v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 191 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. 1963), limiting broker to listing agreements, earnest money contracts, propositions, offers to purchase, options,
afllidavits, purchase agreements, exchange agreements, bills of sale, short form
leases, and contracts of sale; Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, Inc., 186 Va. 80,
41 S.E.2d 720 (1947), holding that preparation of contracts of sale did not constitute unauthorized practice but that preparation of the deed did constitute such
practice.
36. 46 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1950).
37. FLA. STAT. §475.01(2) (1963). The court construed this statute, which
governs the activities of the broker, as warranting restriction to preliminary negotiation.
38. 46 So. 2d at 606.
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court had drawn a clear line of demarcation, but had simply advised
the buyer and seller to seek legal counsel once the preliminary negotia39
tions had ended.
Broker misunderstanding of the Keyes decision led to the St. Petersburg suits of 1953.40 The complainants alleged that the Guarantee
Abstract Company and the West Coast Title Company were preparing
deeds, mortgages, and other instruments incident to conveyances and
that the title company was rendering opinions of title. It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the final decrees of the chancellor, which
were substantially identical, but it will suffice to say that he completely
disregarded the mandate of Keyes. Instead he ruled that the defendants could close a real estate transaction by completion of certain
standard forms 41 so long as the relationship of broker, insurer, or agent
of insurer was maintained and there was no separate charge for preparation of the instruments. Both cases reached the supreme court under
the titles, Cooperman v. Guarantee Abstract Co. and Cooperman v.
West Coast Title Co.42 The court held that the defendant corporations
could validly investigate and render an opinion of title but only in
those instances involving the issuance of title insurance. The court
43
explained:
[I]n the search for intelligence upon which must depend the
decision either to issue or decline a commitment, the corporation
cannot be said to be engaging in the practice of law, for to practice law one must have a client and in such instances their clients are themselves.
The court warned that the performance of any acts relating to a determination of insurability did not in any instance warrant or sanction a
39. See Cooperman, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Realtors in Flor-

Ida, 8 Mmit L.Q. 41 (1953).
40. Cooperman v. Guarantee Abstract Co., 5 Fla. Supp. 38 (6th Cir. Ct.
1953); Cooperman v. Guarantee Abstract Co., 3 Fla. Supp. 195 (6th Cir. Ct.
1953); Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., Ch. No. 37,760, 6th Cir. Ct. Fla.,
May 14, 1953.
41. The chancellor limited the forms to those prescribed by statute or commonly used by the legal profession. Completion was limited to dates, amounts,
names of parties, latest tax liability, and description of property involved. Defendants were enjoined from the preparation of certain complex instruments, but
were allowed to complete a wide range of other instruments, such as (1) contracts of sale, (2) deeds, (3) purchase money mortgages, and (4) leases. (Entire list omitted.) The effect was to attempt a demarcation between simple and
complex instruments.
42. 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954).
43. Id. at 820.
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charge other than the premium price.4 4 In considering the issue of
drafting or completing forms of conveyance, the court expressed disapproval of the chancellor's sweeping decree and returned the case
with instructions to amend his decree in accordance with the guide
lines of Keyes.
The opinion leaves some doubt whether the title company, having
decided that a title is uninsurable, may advise its prospective client of
the legal nature of the defect and how it can be corrected. 45 It is clear,
however, that the title company is limited to the question
of insur46
ability as opposed to marketability or validity of title.
Both the Keyes and Cooperrancases are the result of judicial attempt 'to compromise between competing interests. In an attempt to
reach a decision acceptable to both the bar and the realtor, the supreme court has divided the ordinary real estate transaction into
spheres of interest, allocating the preliminary negotiation to the broker
and reserving the final completion of the transaction to the lawyer.
One might validly criticize the Florida solution as failing to answer
adequately the questions posed by the conflicting interests. It cannot
be said that in every transaction the broker's interest ends with the preliminary negotiation, for his commission may depend on the consummation of sale and the closing of the transaction. The current solution
does not eliminate the objection to the inconvenience resulting from a
requirement of legal counsel. The appearance of the attorney is
merely delayed. Certainly it is not safe to assume that preliminary
negotiation is free from legal entanglements that lead to litigation. An
attorney could conclude that, if public policy demands adequate protection for the interested parties, the broker should be preempted entirely from the field of drafting and completion of legal instruments.
However, such a position is susceptible to dangerous repercussions.
As previously mentioned, the Arizona Supreme Court in State Bar
of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co.4 7 rendered a decision
most adverse to the broker. In effect, he was completely denied the
44. Id. at 821.
45. In Herter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179
S.W.2d 946 (1944), the court held that an abstract and title insurance company
might point out title defects leading to its refusal to insure, but it could not give
advice as to the marketability of title or the steps necessary to remedy the defect.
46. "We do not understand that appellees undertake to pass primarily upon
the marketability or validity of the title or interest, but upon its insurability. In
other words, the whole effort of the appellee-corporations is to determine the risk
that will be taken if the policy issues." Cooperman v. Guarantee Abstract Co., 75
So. 2d 818, 820-21 (Fla. 1954).
47. 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 871

P.2d 1020 (1962).
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right to complete a conveyance form. Following this decision the
brokers sponsored an amendment to the Arizona Constitution that
entitled them to draft or complete any instrument incident to a land
transaction, provided no charge was made for this activity. 48 On November 6, 1962, in a state referendum, the proposed amendment passed
by an overwhelming vote of 224,177 to 61,316. 41 The unfortunate
incident should speak for itself. Perhaps a compromise is the only
realistic and reasonable solution.
THE AcconurTr AND Tm Fm

OF TAX LAw

The lawyer's definition of the practice of law necessarily includes
the construction and application of statutory provisions. No person
can adequately deal with tax problems unless he studies and interprets, to some extent, the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the
Treasury Regulations, and other laws both state and local. In approaching the controversy between the bar and the accountant, one
should keep in mind several considerations. First, the tax field is a
complicated area of the law, an area in which many lawyers are inadequately experienced. Second, since accountants have long been
engaged in the tax field, many are well versed in the problems of tax
work. Third, few attorneys, in all probability, desire to do the routine
work of the accountant which, as before mentioned, entails some intrusion into -the lawyer's concept of the practice of law.
Completion of Tax Returns and the Giving of Legal Advice
The Florida Bar has yet to launch an attack in the courts against
the activities of accountants within the state, but several other jurisdictions have considered the problem. Generally the courts have held
that preparation and completion of income tax forms does not in itself
constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 10 In Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb,51 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a C.P.A. in
preparing the returns of salaried workers was not engaged in the prac48. The amendment gave the broker the "right to draft or fill out and complete, without charge, any and all instruments incident ... [to a real estate sale,
exchange, trade, or rental] including, but not limited to, preliminary purchase
agreements and earnest money receipts, deeds, mortgages, leases, assignments,
releases, contracts for sale of realty, and bills of sale." Amz. CONST. art.
XXVI, §1.
49. See Bertsein, The Arizona Realtors and the 1962 Arizona Constitutional

Amendment, 29 UNAumoraED PRAcnc Nxws 169 (1963).
50. E.g., Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (Super.
Ct. 1954); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951).
51. 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943).
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tice of law. The court reserved the question of complicated tax problems, but recognized that the C.P.A. necessarily does work of a legal
nature and must be aware of the legal consequences of his acts. Realizing the extreme difficulty involved in distinguishing between problems that did not demand legal counsel and those that did, the court
52
concluded:
Doubtless the examination of statutes, judicial decisions, and
departmental rulings, for the purpose of advising upon a question of law relative to taxation, and the rendering to a client of
an opinion thereon, are ... the practice of law in which only
members of the bar may engage.
Apparently the Massachusetts court has drawn a distinction between questions involving a determination of the most advantageous
method of reporting income and questions involving legal justification
for the adoption of a particular method of preparing the return. If the
accountant was uncertain of the legal consequences of his acts, the
court would not allow him to seek a solution on his own. Perhaps this
distinction affords a working proposition, but it is evident that an attempt to decide a question in the abstract is impractical.
Other jurisdictions have offered varying solutions to the general
problem. In In re Bercu5 3 a corporation operating on the accrual
method of accounting requested advice from a C.P.A. as to the correct
time of payment of certain sales taxes. The New York court held that
in giving advice to the corporation, the accountant unlawfully engaged
in the practice of law. The court, however, recognized a distinction
between the giving of advice by an accountant retained to render services throughout the ordinary course of his client's business and the giving of advice by an accountant not so employed. This distinction has
been expressly rejected in several subsequent cases, notably the decision of Gardner v. Conway.54 In the Conway case the Minnesota Supreme Court restrained the accountant from resolving "difficult or
doubtful questions" The court held that the mere preparation of a
return is not the practice of law, but stated:5
If taxation is a hybrid of law and accounting, it does not follow
that it is so wholly -without the law that its legal activities may
52. Id. at 183, 52 N.E.2d at 83.
53. 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451

(1949).
54. 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951); accord, Agran v. Shapiro, supra

note 50.
55. Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 480-81, 48 N.W.2d 788, 796 (1951).
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be pursued without proper qualifications and without court supervision. The interest of the public is not protected by the narrow specialization of an individual who lacks the perspective
and the orientation which comes only from a thorough knowledge and understanding of basic legal concepts of legal processes, and of the interrelation of the law in all its branches.
Although the efforts of the court illustrate an honest attempt to set a
limit to an accountant's activities, a test based upon a determination of
what is "difficult or doubtful" is difficult to apply.
An example of strong judicial restraint placed on the activities of
accountants is found in Agran v. Shapiro.58

In Agran, a C.P.A. who

was admitted to practice before the Treasury Department but was not
a member of the California Bar, brought suit to recover compensation
for services rendered by him. The defendant contended that the employment contract should not be enforced because the accountant's
services constituted the unlawful practice of law. The court held that,
although the preparation of tax forms was not unlawful conduct, the
accountant had illegally engaged in the practice of law in preparing
defendant's application for a carry back adjustment of loss and in advising defendant in his opposition to assessments claimed by the Treasury Department. The court expressly rejected the "incidental to employment" distinction set forth in Bercu and adopted the opinion of
Conway by stating that a measure of the complexity of a problem
should not be based upon the understanding of a trained legal mind
but upon the understanding "possessed by a normal intelligent layman,
who is reasonably familiar with similar transactions." 57 Plantiff was
thus denied compensation for his services rendered in violation of state
law.

Both Conway and Agran are harsh decisions against the accountant. The Agran decision has been criticized as an unreasonable and
unrealistic appraisal of the accountant's normal activities. 58 In several
federal court decisions there is language to the effect that it is a normal
and ordinary thing for an accountant to advise a client on matters involving tax liability.59 Nevertheless, a solution to the problem should
not rest upon whether the giving of advice is normal and ordinary, but
56. 24 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (Super. Ct. 1954).
57. Id. at 817, 273 P.2d at 626.
58. See Griswold, A FurtherLook: Lawyers and Accountants, 41 A.B.A.J. 1113
(1955). See also Effenbem v. Luckenbach Terminals Inc., 111 N.J. 67, 166 Atl.
91 (1933) where the court concluded that it was reasonable for an accountant to
advise a corporation in the change of its stock structure in order to secure tax savings.
59. See Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 558 (5th Cir.
1952); Bancroft v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 49,56 (W.D. La. 1962).
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upon whether such practice poses a substantial risk of harm to the public. It is difficult to see how an accountant could safely advise his clients on matters of tax liability without making a thorough analysis of
relevant judicial decisions. Thus a realistic solution should include a
determination whether it is normal for an accountant, prior to giving
advice, to research and analyze judicial interpretation and construction
of statutory tax provisions.
The Activities of the Accountant in Relation to His Right To Practice
Before the Treasury Department and the Tax Court
In Agran v. Shapiro60 the C.P.A. argued that, since his practice before the Treasury Department was controlled by federal legislation, a
state might not constitutionally interfere with this right. His contention was rejected. The court concluded that the right of a state to define and control the unauthorized practice of law did not conflict with
the right of the federal agency to prescribe rules governing practice
before it. The Florida Supreme Court has expressed a similar view.
In Petition of Kearney,61 petitioner, a citizen and resident of Florida,
and a member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court, the
Tax Court, and the Treasury Department, sought an opinion on his
right to practice in Florida as a "Federal Tax Counsel:" Petitioner was
not a member of The Florida Bar. Following an opinion given by The
Florida Bar Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, the court
held that petitioner could not lawfully engage in his intended practice
without admission to The Florida Bar. The court stated: 62
The American Bar Association is committed to like policy and
holds, as do many states, that practice before the Tax Court and
Treasury Department of the United States may constitute the
practice of law which may be enjoined if attempted by one not
admitted to practice.
Whether the Florida Supreme Court would enjoin an accountant
from giving advice concerning tax liability when the accountant is acting in the normal course of employment, is somewhat uncertain. Presumably the court would not allow this. The Kearney decision, however, does not reach this question, for the court states:63
It follows that those who hold themselves out to practice in any
field or phase of law must be members of the Florida Bar, amenable to the rules and regulations of Florida Courts.
60.
61.
62.
63.

127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (Super. Ct. 1954).
63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953).

ibid.
Id. at 631. (Emphasis added.)
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Another distinction must be drawn as to those situations in which a
taxpayer has already encountered legal difficulty with the Treasury Department and retains an accountant to represent him in the litigation.
It is upon this ground that the congressional provisions and the federal
regulations governing practice before federal administrative agencies
must inevitably conflict with contrary state policy. Congress has given
the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to regulate practice before
the Department. 4 The Secretary has since provided for practice before the Department by C.P.A.'s and other laymen. 66 This right to
practice extends to all activities connected with the preparation of a
case and encompasses both formal argument before the Department
and negotiation with a Treasury official located in a branch or field
office.6 6 Thus, the regulations are clearly applicable to activities occurring within the confines of a state. Congress has similarly provided
States when
for practice by laymen before the Tax Court of the United
67
such persons are admitted to the bar of that court.
It is readily apparent that a formidable legal argument is available
to an accountant who, in preparation of a client's case before the Treasury Department or the Tax Court, is confronted with a charge of unauthorized practice of law. Before discussing the feasibility of such
action, it is perhaps best to analyze other alternatives.
The Florida Bar could increase its efforts to negotiate differences
with members of the accounting profession. In 1951 a joint committee
of lawyers and accountants issued a "Statement of Principles Relating
to Practice in the Field of Income Taxation Promulgated by 'the Na68
tional Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants."
The statement was an attempt to resolve many of the differences confronting attorneys and C.P.A.'s. In general, the statement called for
close cooperation between the professions. Specifically, it recognized
that both lawyers and C.P.A.'s may prepare income tax returns. The
joint committee advised retention of legal counsel in the following situations: (1) where the C.P.A. must resolve the tax consequences of a
transaction; (2) in proceedings before the Treasury Department when
the C.P.A. encounters questions of legal significance; (3) upon receipt
of formal notice of a deficiency decree; (4) in preparation of a claim
for refund where the claim involves a legal question or is to be the
64. 23 Stat. 258 (1884), 5 U.S.C. §261 (1958).
65. 31 C.F.R. §§10.3(d),(e) (1959).
66. 31 C.F.R. §10.2(b) (1959).
67. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §7452: "No qualified person shall be denied
admission to practice before the Tax Court because of his failure to be a member
of any profession or calling."
68. The Statement may be found in 87 A.B.A.J. 517 (1951).
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"basis of litigation"; and (5) whenever the C.P.A.'s client is faced with
criminal tax investigation.
The committee further recognized that financial analysis involving
financial statements, accounting methods, or accounting procedures demanded the services of an accountant. Preparation of wills, instruments of conveyance, trust instruments, or other similar documents was
left exclusively to the legal profession. It was agreed that an accountant should not describe himself as a "tax expert" or "tax consultant," nor
should a lawyer hold himself out as qualified in a "special branch of
law practice."
The statement of 1951 has since been reaffirmed by both the American Bar Association and the American Institute of Accountants. 9 Although the 1951 statement is phrased in very general terms, it does
afford a common ground upon which negotiation may be conducted.
In order to effect local collaboration between the lawyer and the accountant, The Florida Bar must be willing to forego litigation and provide a mutual forum where both lawyers and accountants may discuss
their difficulties. A problem does exist in that not all accountants are
C.P.A.'s; an agreement with the latter might not bind the former. But
before any attorney rejects negotiation as ridiculous or unreasonable,
he should carefully weigh the bar's chances for "success" in the courts.
In any proposed action a careful analysis must be made to determine
whether 'the objectionable activities of the accountant are related to
litigation before a federal administrative agency. Consideration should
also be given to whether the accountant's activities might be related to
a matter that could ultimately lead to controversy before a federal
agency. An adverse decision by the United States Supreme Court
would place the bar in a difficult position from which negotiation
would seem to be impossible. The 1963 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Sperry v. State of Floridaex rel. The FloridaBar70
affords adequate warning.

THE SPERRY CASE
In 1962 The Florida Bar instituted proceedings in the Florida Supreme Court to enjoin defendant Sperry from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.7 1 Although he was not a member of The
Florida Bar or an attorney, Sperry openly represented himself to the
public as a 'Tatent Attorney." Sperry was registered to practice before
the United States Patent Office. The bar alleged that the following
activities of Sperry constituted the unauthorized practice of law.
69. J.Accountancy, Jan. 1957, p. 53.

70. 378 U.S. 379 (1968).
71. State ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962).
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(1) He represented himself as a "Patent Attorney."
(2) He rendered opinions as to patentability and advised as to
patent rights.
(3) He prepared, and filed with the Patent Office in Washington, D.C., applications and amendments to applications for letters
patent.
Sperry admitted that he was engaged in the alleged activities, but
he contended that his work was connected only with the Patent Office
and should not be restricted by state judicial decree. Upon the bar's
motion for summary decree the court permanently enjoined petitioner
from engaging in the above activities unless he became a member of
72
The Florida Bar.

The court concluded that the State could validly define and prohibit the unauthorized practice of law within its confines notwithstanding federal statutes or administrative regulations governing the practice before a federal agency. This position of the court was nearly
identical to that previously espoused in Petition of Kearney.73
Having granted Sperry's petition for writ of certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and held that Florida could not prohibit a nonlawyer, registered to practice before the United States Patent Office, from engaging in activities incidental to his work before the
Patent Office. In reaching its decision the Court did not question the
Florida Supreme Court's determination that Sperry's activities constituted the unauthorized practice of law; 74 rather it concluded: 75
[S]ince patent practitioners are authorized to practice only before the Patent Office, the State maintains control over the practice of law within its borders except to the limited extent necessary for the accomplishment of the federal objectives.
The Court made no attempt to define the activities in which petitioner might lawfully engage, but it stated in a footnote: 76
We note . . . that a practitioner authorized to prepare patent

applications must of course render opinions as to the patentability of the inventions brought to him, and that it is entirely reasonable for a practitioner to hold himself out as qualified 'to perform his specialized work, so long as he does not misrepresent
the scope of his license.
72.
78.
74.
75.
76.

Ibid.
63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953).
Sperry v. State ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 402, n.47. The Court did not consider whether Sperry could refer
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The bar argued that the regulations governing practice before the
Patent Office should be construed as not authorizing practice inconsistent with state law. The bar contended, therefore, that petitioner's
practice should be limited to Washington, D.C., the home of the Patent
Office. This argument was based on a current regulation of the Patent
Office providing, "registration in the Patent Office . . . shall only entitle persons registered to practice before the Patent Office." 7 The bar
argued that this regulation should be read in light of a predecessor
regulation that provided that registration "shall not be construed as
authorizing persons not members of the bar to practice law."1 8 It
should be noted that this latter provision is nearly identical with past
regulations governing practice before the Treasury Department.7 9 The
Court, in rejecting respondents argument of construction, determined
that an analysis of congressional intent and a historical review of the
policy of the Patent Office led to a conclusion that nonlawyers were,
and should be, qualified to practice before that federal agency.
Although the Sperry case is a strong blow against the right of a state
to control the unauthorized practice of law within its borders, the total
effect of the decision will not become apparent for some time. The
decision does not affect activities unconnected with a federal administrative agency, but it is unclear just what activities will fall within the
scope of practice before such an agency.
The Sperry opinion purports only to cover practice before the Patent Office, but a careful reading leads to the conclusion that the Court
has, in effect, reached many federal agencies. One may reasonably
conclude that where, by congressional enactment or administrative regulation, a layman is accorded the right to engage in practice before a
federal administrative agency, a state may not validly prohibit or restrict those activities that are related to work that leads, or may reasonably lead, to practice before the department or agency. To date the
Supreme Courts of Georgia, Florida, and Wisconsin, respectively, have
recognized the right of a layman to engage in activities incident to

to himself as a "Patent Attorney" as he had voluntarily discontinued the use of the
term. Id. at 383, n.1.

77. 37 C.F.R. §1.341 (1960).
78. 3 Fed. Reg. 2429 (1938).
79. 1 Fed. Reg. 1413 (1936), provided in part: "That nothing in the regulations in this part shall be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar
to practice law." This language has been deleted from current regulations. See
31 C.F.R. §10.2(b) (1959).
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practice before the Treasury Department,8" the Patent Office,8 ' and the
82
Interstate Commerce Commission.
It is very likely that the next area of conflict will involve the socalled "tax expert," the nonlawyer admitted to practice before the
Treasury Department. If the United States Supreme Court, as can be
expected, eventually overrides Florida's policy as outlined in Kearney"3
and California's position in the Agran. decision, 84 it should confine the
role of the accountant to remedial activities or that work done directly
in preparation for an appearance before the Treasury Department or
the Tax Court. To do otherwise would be to sanction the general practice of law by one not admitted to the state bar.

Acrnrrms FOR FuTu1E

INVESTIGAON

The bar should investigate several areas in which the activities of
laymen currently pose a serious risk of harm to the public. The area of
estate planning is of primary importance. Accountants, trust companies, and insurance companies appear to be deeply involved in this
type of work. The California Bar has taken definite steps toward halt80. See Noble v. Hunt, 95 Ga. App. 804, 99 S.E.2d 345 (1957), wherein the
court held that a C.P.A. holding a power of attorney might validly advise his client
in representing him before the United States Tax Court and the Treasury Department, and that such activity did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law in
Georgia.
81. The Florida Supreme Court, in an amended decree, State ex tel. The
Florida Bar v. Sperry, 159 So. 2d 229 (1964), modified its opinion so as not to
prevent Sperry from "advising, assisting and representing applicants before the
United States Patent Office" and from "rendering opinions as to patent ability"
where necessary in this work. Although the court recognized Sperry's right to
hold himself out as qualified to do the above, it declined to acknowledge his right
to use the term "patent attorney."
82. In State ex rel. State Bar of Wisconsin v. Keller, 16 Wis. 2d 877, 114
N.W.2d 796 (1962), the court enjoined defendant, who was not a member of the
Wisconsin Bar but licensed to practice before the I.C.C. and the Public Service
Commission of Indiana, from advising clients as to their legal rights and representing them before the Wisconsin Public Service Commission. The United States
Supreme Court vacated judgment, 374 U.S. 102 (1963), and remanded in light of
the Sperry decision. On remand, 123 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. 1963), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized the defendant's right to advise and instruct clients as
to matters pending before the I.C.C., to prepare papers for submission to the
I.C.C., and to hold himself out as qualified to perform this work. The court affirmed its original injunction prohibiting the defendant from performing services
in a representative capacity before the Wisconsin Public Service Commission. Cf.
People ex tel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937).
83. Petition of Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953).
84. Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (Super. Ct.

1954).
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ing the activities of those business organizations that, without the aid
of legal counsel, undertake to advise and aid in the creation of trusts,
pension profit sharing plans, and "estate" or "tax" plans. Several cases
are currently pending in the California lower courts.85
The Oregon State Bar Association recently won a major decision
against a corporation that, while selling life insurance, advised and
aided clients in the preparation of estate plans. In Oregon State Bar
v. John H. Miller & Co.86 the court held that the defendant corporation
could not advise in selection, preparation, or construction of legal instruments, particularly wills and trusts, nor could it advise as to the
legal effects of estate planning. The court was specifically concerned
with the giving of advice on the necessary cash requirement for estate
tax purposes, and the tax consequences of life insurance.
Many bank and trust companies prepare wills and trust agreements
and advise of the legal effect of these instruments. There is authority
supporting the view that this constitutes the unauthorized practice of
2
law. '
The area of insurance claims adjusting also deserves close scrutiny
by the bar. When an adjuster gives legal advice concerning the rights
and liabilities of a claimant, he has certainly crossed the line into the
practice of law. s8
'Budget planning" or debt adjusting, an activity whereby a person
or corporation undertakes, for a fee, to distribute a client's money to
his creditors, has been prohibited by the Florida legislature unless conducted by a practicing attorney who is a member of The Florida Bar.89
The Kansas State Bar Association recently concluded a successful campaign against such activities when the United States Supreme Court
upheld a Kansas statute prohibiting "debt adjusting." 0 The Kansas
statute is substantially the same as that of Florida.
CONCLUSION

To date judicial review of the activities of laymen engaged in the
85. See 29 UNAuTHoRrL

PRACrICE NEws, 235 (1963).

86. 385 P.2d 181 (Ore. 1963).
87. See Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408
(1954); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 404 (1960). But see Merrick et al. v. American
Security & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C.C. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625
(1940); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140
A.2d 863 (1958), reo'd in part, 146 Conn. 556, 153 A.2d 453 (1959), holding
general advice as to federal and state tax laws, trusts, and wills does not constitute
unauthorized practice if no fee is charged and service is incidental to business.
88. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 180 S.W.2d 945 (1939).
89. FLA. STAT. §§559.10-.13 (1963).
90. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol16/iss4/5

20

Messer: The
Unauthorized
Practice
of Law in Florida
UNIVERSITY
OF
FLORIDA LAW
REVIEW
[VCol. XVI

unauthorized practice of law in Florida has been limited. It is only in
the area of conveyancing that the law appears settled. In passing
upon the realtor's right to draft or prepare instruments incidental to
the purchase and sale of real property, the Florida Supreme Court has
restricted the broker to preparation of those instruments which are a
part of the preliminary negotiation. A broker in Florida may prepare
a memorandum, deposit receipt, or contract recording his activity in
bringing the interested parties together. The remainder of the transaction lies in the field of the lawyer. The court has further held that a
title company, in insuring a title, may validly research the title and
render an opinion of insurability. It may not give legal advice on the
marketability of title. Further litigation in these areas seems to be
unnecessary, and the bar could best serve the public by turning its
attention to the activities of the unqualified "estate planner."
The insurance salesman or trust officer, acting without legal counsel
and having a substantial financial interest in the subject matter, presents a poor substitute for the objective and analytical reasoning of the
attorney. One familiar with the tax consequences of estate planning,
the law of future interests, or concerned with the uncertainty surrounding the permissible use and scope of the revocable inter vivos
trust in Florida 91 should recognize the danger that presently confronts
the public. Effectively utilizing advertising campaigns and pressure
sales techniques, the estate planner constitutes a public menace demanding the immediate attention of the bar.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Sperry case
is most unfortunate, both for the bar and the public at large. Today,
the power of Florida or of any other state to regulate the activities of a
layman permitted to practice before a federal agency is at best uncertain. One can easily imagine the many difficulties arising out of the
establishment of numerous quasi-legal professions, each highly specialized and operating, for the most part, uncontrolled by the state judicial
system. 92
It is probable that the next area of conflict will involve the accountant or "tax expert" admitted to practice before the Treasury Department and Tax Court. There is a vast difference between the comparatively narrow and impersonal practice of patent law and the field of tax
law, which encompasses a wide range of business activity, personal
investment, estate planning, and to some extent domestic affairs. A
91. See Roth, Estate Planning in Florida: The Revocable inter Vivos Trust,
16 U. FLA. L. REv. 34 (1963).
92. While the Florida Bar protects the public from unethical practices of its
members, generally speaking no similar organization exists to scrutinize the professional conduct of laymen engaged in practice before a federal administrative
agency.
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judicial decision patterned after Sperry would allow many accountants
to control completely the course of a client's tax litigation. However,
it is mandatory that competent legal counsel be retained for the protection of the client. For example, upon receipt of a statutory notice of
deficiency, the taxpayer must choose between alternative courses of
action. He may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency, or he may pay the deficiency and seek a refund
in the district court or Court of Claims. Conflicting decisions in the
Tax Court and circuit court of appeal could determine the best course
of action. A district court would be bound by a prior decision of the
circuit court of appeal in the same circuit while the Tax Court would
not. A determination of the advantages of a trial by jury is a further
important consideration. The district court alone affords trial by jury.
Of course other considerations are relevant,93 but in each decision to
litigate the accountant must advise his client to contest the asserted
deficiency in the Tax Court or to pay and seek a refund by way of the
district court or Court of Claims. His choice of forum necessarily involves a conflict of interests, in that an accountant is only permitted to
practice before the Tax Court.
A realistic appraisal of the problems facing the bar and the accountant as well as other professions, necessarily includes consideration of alternatives to litigation. Of primary importance is negotiation
and the possibility of agreement based upon principles satisfactory to
both the bar and a competing interest. The problem of the unauthorized practice of law cannot be solved by definition alone. Perhaps the
problem is in part an economic conflict, but the ultimate objective of all
should be the protection of the public against unwarranted loss of valuable property rights, resulting from advice given by those lacking the
training and skill to understand the legal consequences of a given
transaction.
JAES EUnorr MEssER
93. If in a given case counsel feels that the issue must inevitably be decided
by the United States Supreme Court, he might give consideration to the Court of

Claims. No appeal may be taken from the Court of Claims; however, certiorari
lies to the Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme Court may be reached in two
steps as opposed to three in cases proceeding through the Tax Court or district
court.
Other problems include the client's ability to pay a refund, a prerequisite to
suit in the district court. If the taxpayer is successful in obtaining a refund, the
Government pays his claim and in addition 6%interest running from the date he
paid the asserted deficiency. Conversely, if the taxpayer unsuccessfully contests
the Government's asserted deficiency, he must pay the amount and 6%interest
running from the date the tax was originally due.
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